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A. Independence in times of crisis 
“It shall be independent in the exercise of its powers and in the management of its 
finances.” Though this rule1 concerning the ECB did not enjoy the privilege of 
being quoted on one of Germany’s most prominent tabloid papers (“Bild”) as it was 
the case with the no-bail-out clause of Art. 125 TFEU, the ECB’s independent status 
is something any regular newspaper reader is most surely aware of – at least since 
the Eurocrisis.2 From a normative perspective recent developments, however, have 
once again raised the question of the exact content of central bank independence.  
How does this institutional setting, for instance, influence the lawfulness of the 
announced bond purchases according to the ECB’s OMT-Program? Might these not 
create a questionable dependency of the ECB as regards the fiscal policy of the 
respective Member States? And vice versa: Could the ECB’s status impose 
normative restrictions on the fiscal and economic policy of a Member State? Or are 
possible negative consequences of these policies entirely irrelevant for the 
monetary mandate of the ECB and simply left for the ECB itself to handle? And 
just recently the OMT-Decisions of the German Constitutional Court3 and its 
second request for preliminary ruling initiated in July 20174 have brought up the 
question of judicial control: Is such control compatible with the independent status 
of the ECB or are there at least certain restrictions as regards its intensity that might 
be derived directly from the ECB’s independent status? These – among others – are 
the questions the paper seeks to find answers to. 
To do so I will first take a brief look at the economic and judicial justification for 
the independent status of central banks in general (B) and will thereby also illustrate 
the different manifestations of independence that need to be distinguished (C) – 
though the ECB, the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve all enjoy some sort 
of independent status within their mandate, its degree still differs significantly.  
Recent developments will then form the initial point for a detailed analysis of the 
concrete range of the ECB’s independence (D). While (normal) and usually verbal 
criticism by the media, scholars or politicians will generally be just as 
unproblematic as certain duties to report or to cooperate, the Member States’ fiscal 
                                                          
1 Art. 282 (3) TFEU. 
2 For the causes of the Eurocrisis see A. Thiele, Das Mandat der EZB und die Krise des Euro, p. 1 
ff. 
3 BVerfGE 134, 366 (request for preliminary ruling) and BVerfG NJW 2016, 2473 (final decision). 
See also S. Kadelbach, ECB Unbound?, Jura 2017, 940 ff. 
4 BVerfG, 18.7.2017, 2 BvR 859/15 and others. 
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and wage policy, possible bond purchases by the ECB as well as a too extensive 
judicial control might indeed – at least under certain circumstances – present a 
challenge for the independent status of the ECB. Yet, the paper will nonetheless be 
able to end with a positive conclusion: Until today the independent status has not 
been violated by any of the analysed measures. Possible threats, however, continue 
to exist. Safeguarding the independent status of the ECB thus remains an important 
mission not only for legal scholars.  
 
B. The justicification of central bank independence 
I. Economic background 
Though this might come as a surprise to the general public, the independent status 
of a central bank is no matter of course. Due to the fact that central banks perform 
responsibilities of public administration, integrating these agencies into the general 
hierarchical organisation of administration – with the government at the top – would 
appear a lot more convincing (especially in Germany). No one would ever think of 
an independent ministry of finance for instance. And also from a historical 
perspective independence from governmental interference is by no means the 
somewhat natural status of a central bank.5 Not least the Bank of England (as the 
oldest central bank) was in actual fact founded in 1694 especially to help Great 
Britain’s government out of its financial misery that had occurred due to several 
(and not always successful) war affairs, as Albert E. Feavearyear points out: 
“Finally, and almost as a last resource, they founded the Bank of England.”6 Quite 
similarly Alexander Hamilton hoped for significant assistance, „in obtaining 
pecuniary aids, especially in sudden emergencies“7 when founding the first Bank 
of the United States in 1791.  
Only the gradual switch of central banks from such “Banks of the State” to “Banks 
of the Banks” that took place during the 19th and 20th century makes the whole 
“independence-debate”8 understandable. It is only since then that their main 
                                                          
5 For the development of central banks see A. Thiele, Finanzaufsicht, 2014, p. 188 ff. 
6 A. E. Feavearyear, The Pound Stearling, 1963, p. 125. See also C. Goodhart/F. Capie/N. Schnadt, 
The development of central banking, in: Capie et al, The Future of Central Banking, 1994, p. 1 (4 
ff.). 
7 A. Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, in: Kroos, Documentary History of Banking and Currency 
in the United States, 1985, p. 231 ff. 
8 See for the changing relationship of central banks and the government C. Goodhart/F. Capie/N. 
Schnadt, The development of central banking, in: Capie et al, The Future of Central Banking, 1994, 
p. 48 ff. 
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objective – with diverging focal points – lies in safeguarding price stability9 which 
is also the “core purpose”10 of the ECB11  according to Art. 127 (1) TFEU.12 The 
responsibility for this new core purpose forms the actual starting point of the whole 
independence discussion. The opening question is: Can a central bank perform this 
new task effectively as long as it is integrated into and thus dependent from (or even 
controlled by) the government? Two possible problems might hinder such an 
effective performance: First of all several inflation favouring conflicts of interests 
might arise as regards the governmental fiscal, wage, and employment policy.13 
And second of all politicians might be apt to consider a price-enhancing expansion 
of money supply in order to profit from the possible short term economy-boosting 
effects14 while neglecting the long-term inflationary impact of such measures – 
especially with general elections coming closer.15 Already the expectation of such 
governmental actions by the market participants combined with significant 
credibility deficits due to existing time lags16 would by themselves have the 
potential to create an inflationary environment – even where the government should 
in actual fact refrain from such measures.17 
 
                                                          
9 See C. Goodhart/F. Capie/N. Schnadt, The development of central banking, in: Capie et al, The 
Future of Central Banking, 1994, p. 81. See also H. James, Making the European Monetary Union, 
p. 15. According to C. Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, p. 34 ff. the 
financial crisis has shown that central banks also have a responsibility for maintaining financial 
stability and should see this as their second core purpose. 
10 C. Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, p. 34. 
11 For the definition of price stability within the EMU see A. Thiele, Das Mandat der EZB und die 
Krise des Euro, p. 27 ff. as well as J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 63 ff. 
12 The corresponding exclusive right to authorise the issue of bank notes is transferred upon the ECB 
by Art. 128 (1) TFEU. 
13 See J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 185 ff. 
14 See for instance R. J. Barro/D. Gordon, Rules, discretion, and reputation in a positive model of 
monetary policy, Journal of Monetary Economics 12 (1983), 101 ff.: „The benefits from this surprise 
inflation may include expansions of economic activity and reductions in the real value of the 
government’s national liabilities.“ 
15 See H. Jarchow, Grundriss der Geldpolitik, p. 3 as well as H. Siekmann, in: Siekmann, EWU, 
2013, Art. 130 AEUV, mn. 26 ff. 
16 See J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 190 ff. This phenomenon is also 
known as “time inconsistency” or “dynamic inconcistence”, see F. Kydland/E. Prescott, Rules rather 
than Discretion: The inconsistency of Optimal Plans, Journal of Political Economy 85 (1977), 473 
ff. 
17 See R. J. Barro/D. Gordon, Rules, discretion, and reputation in a positive model of monetary 
policy, Journal of Monetary Economics 12 (1983), p. 101 ff., who point out that governmental 
assurance in this area is simply not credible: „However, because people understand the 
policymaker’s incentives, these types of surprises – and their resulting benefits – cannot arise 
systematically in equlibrium.“ 
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As can be seen in an article by Milton Friedman published in 196218 the answer to 
this question was discussed more or less openly at first. However, in the middle of 
the 1980s the pendulum continuously began to swing more and more towards the 
supporters of independence. Trend-setting thereby was a paper by Kenneth Rogoff, 
who proposed – in order to avoid the inflationary incentives of the “policymaker”19 
analysed gametheoretically by Robert Barro and David Gordon20 – to lay monetary 
policy in the hands of a conservative (and independent) agent. This agent thereby 
should be known to place a greater weight on inflation stabilization relative to 
unemployment stabilization.21 In other words: He should be „(somewhat) more 
inflation-conscious than average“.22 Though Rogoff saw the problem that his 
institutional setting might impair the stabilizing function of monetary policy23 – a 
function that could be witnessed during the last financial- and following Eurocrisis 
– he believed such an effect unavoidable yet diminishable by choosing a 
conservative but not too conservative agent.24 During the 1990s the necessity of an 
independent central bank – supported by several empirical studies25 – finally 
became26 a central if not the central pillar of modern central bank theory27 finding 
                                                          
18 M. Friedman, Should There Be an Independent Bank?, in: Yeager, In Search of a Monetary 
Constitution, 1962, S. 219 ff. Friedman spoke out against an independent central bank: „Money is 
too important to be left to the central bankers.“ See also W. Heun, Die Zentralbank in den USA – 
das Federal Reserve System, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis, 9 (1998), 241 (262). 
19 Meaning a government, that is also responsible for monetary policy. 
20 R. J. Barro/D. Gordon, A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model, Journal 
of Political Economy 91 (1983), 588 ff.; R. J. Barro/D. Gordon, Rules, discretion, and reputation in 
a positive model of monetary policy, Journal of Monetary Economics 12 (1983), S. 101 ff.  
21 K. Rogoff, The optimal degree of commitment to an immediate monetary target, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 100 (1985), 1169 (1177): „We demonstrate that society can make itself better off by 
selecting an agent to head the independent central bank who is known to place a greater weight on 
inflation stabilization (relative to unemployment stabilization) than is embodied in the social loss 
function A.“ 
22 K. Rogoff, The optimal degree of commitment to an immediate monetary target, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 100 (1985), p. 1180.  
23 For instance as regards the unemployment rate. 
24 K. Rogoff, The optimal degree of commitment to an immediate monetary target, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 100 (1985), p. 1177: „[…] it is never optimal to choose an individual who is known 
to care ‚too little’ about unemployment […].“ 
25 See especially the detailed study by A. Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and 
Independence: Theory and Evidence, 1992. See also J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und 
Preisstabilität, p. 215 ff. 
26 See H. James, Making the European Monetary Union, p. 270. However, the studies revealed 
significant differences between developed and non-developed countries, see C. E. Walsh, Central 
bank independence, Prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary, 2005, p. 6 f.  
27 B. Hayo/C. Hefeker, Reconsidering central bank independence, European Journal of Political 
Economy 18 (2002), 653 (653 f.). See also H. James, Making the European Monetary Union, p. 265: 
„The 1990s saw the emergence of a new philosophy of central banking, in which the independence 
of central banks from the political process became a core component of the culture of monetary 
stability.“ 
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its temporary endpoint in the creation of the “most independent central bank of 
all”:28 The ECB. 
However, this “intellectual revolution”29 or “intellectual shift toward central bank 
independence”30 did not remain undisputed within the (academic) economic field. 
In actual fact the last years have seen an increasing number of scholars believing 
that an independent central bank is either not necessary or even harmful for ensuring 
price stability – and the historical experience of the last financial crisis has added 
voices to this critical choir.31 Not least John B. Taylor, referring to the above 
mentioned article by the monetarist32 Milton Friedman, has consistently argued that 
it is less the institutional position of a central bank but rather the question whether 
its monetary policy is based on rules (and not on discretion) that is decisive for 
safeguarding price stability.33 Taylor himself thereby offers several empirical 
studies to prove his analysis. However, from a normative perspective Taylors 
arguments hardly make a convincing point against central bank independence for 
two reasons. First of all any rule needs to be interpreted.34 Though Taylor’s rules 
might include clear legal consequences depending on certain economic 
circumstances it will be impossible to conclude whether such circumstances are 
given without some sort of discretion – especially in the field of monetary policy. 
Different interpretations of economic settings remain possible – otherwise 
                                                          
28 B. Hayo/C. Hefeker, Reconsidering central bank independence, European Journal of Political 
Economy 18 (2002), p. 654: „The culmination of this trend is the European Central Bank (ECB) 
that, according to its statutes, is the most independent central bank of all.“ For the difficulties when 
trying to measure the individual degree of independence see H. James, Making the European 
Monetary Union, p. 271 f. 
29 H. James, Making the European Monetary Union, p. 15. 
30 H. James, Making the European Monetary Union, p. 15.  
31 See H. James, Making the European Monetary Union, p. 15, who believes that this effect is at 
least partly rooted in the experiences of the financial crisis: “When that rule or principle became 
muddied, and discretion in policy-making returned in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the case 
for central bank independence began to look more problematic. Thus the historical pendulum is now 
swinging back, toward a politically controlled Bank of England or a more accountable Federal 
Reserve.” 
32 See W. Heun, Die Zentralbank in den USA – das Federal Reserve System, Staatswissenschaften 
und Staatspraxis, 9 (1998), p. 262. 
33 J. B. Taylor, Discretion versus Monetary Policy Rules in Practice, Carnegie Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy, Vol. 39 (1993), 195 ff.; J. B. Taylor, Monetary Policy Rules Work and 
Discretion Doesn’t: A Tale of Two Eras, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 44 (2012), 
1017 ff.; J. B. Taylor, The Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence Versus Policy Rules, 
American Economic Association Annual Meeting, January 2013. 
34 See H. Dreier, Hierarchische Verwaltung im demokratischen Staat, 1991, p. 169: „Selbst der 
handlungsfreudigste, optimal informierte, seiner selbst gewisse Gesetzgeber kann heute auf Dauer 
nicht verbindliche Normen mit einem Konkretisierungsgrad und einer Detailgenauigkeit 
produzieren, die den Handlungsspielraum der zur Normexekution befugten Instanzen auf das 
sprachphilosophisch und methodologisch begründbare unvermeidliche Mindestmaß beschränken.“  
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monetary policy might as well be left to electronical devices, a conclusion even 
Taylor would probably not agree to. At least these remaining discretional 
considerations, however, should remain in the hands of an independent central bank 
(or should at least not be put in those of the government). And second of all (and 
probably even more important): Apart from the existing general interpreting 
problems, nobody has yet been able to formulate monetary rules that fit to any 
economic development without any exception.35 In actual fact Taylor himself did 
not believe his “Taylor-Rule” (to which several central banks reverted to in the past) 
to be necessarily followed under all circumstances – exceptions should be possible. 
Monetary policy without any discretion of the relevant actors thus seems simply not 
possible (at least as of today).36 American central bankers have therefore always 
emphasized that monetary policy is „a matter of judgement“37 and thus „an art 
rather than a science“38. Taylor’s findings therefore might give reason to demand a 
detailed explanation by the central bank when deviating from a well formulated 
monetary rule, his statement “Monetary Policy Rules Work and Discretion 
doesn’t”,39 however, appears way too simplistic (and was probably intended to 
appear so). Putting these necessary at least partly discretionary decisions in the 
hands of independent central bankers (and not the government) thus is nothing 
Taylor’s rules concept would stand against.  
Taylor, however, indeed has a point where he argues that it is less the formal but 
rather the internal independence of central bankers that is decisive.40 And indeed: 
A lot of central bankers might not be equipped with the necessary amount of such 
internal independence as a study by Roland Vaubel suggests even for the so 
                                                          
35 W. Heun, Die Zentralbank in den USA – das Federal Reserve System, Staatswissenschaften und 
Staatspraxis, 9 (1998), p. 262 f. 
36 See C. Goodhart/F. Capie/N. Schnadt, The development of central banking, in: Capie et al, The 
Future of Central Banking, 1994, p. 85: „Given the continuing rapid pace of the evolution of such 
structures, central banks will rightly aim to retain their discretionary flexibility.“ 
37 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Tenth Annual Report 1923, p. 32. 
38 W. McChesney Martin, Statement before the Subcommittee on a National Security and 
International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, FRB 51 (1965), p. 
1237 (1238). See also W. Heun, Die Zentralbank in den USA – das Federal Reserve System, 
Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis, 9 (1998), p. 263. 
39 J. B. Taylor, Monetary Policy Rules Work and Discretion Doesn’t: A Tale of Two Eras, Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 44 (2012), p. 1017 ff. 
40 J. B. Taylor, The Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence Versus Policy Rules, American 
Economic Association Annual Meeting, January 2013, p. 14. Similar also B. Hayo/C. Hefeker, 
Reconsidering central bank independence, European Journal of Political Economy 18 (2002), p. 657 
f. 
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exemplary German Bundesbank.41 But is the potential danger of such a “political 
capture” an argument against the formal independence of central banks as such? 
Obviously not, as only formal independence offers at least the chance of 
independent and goal-focused decisions in the first place. Formal independence is 
thus a necessary yet not sufficient condition42 where one wants to uphold this 
chance (how big or small it may be).43  
The criticism formulated by Bernd Hayo and Carsten Hefeker therefore focuses on 
a different aspect of the independence dogma. They first of all point out that the 
repeated negative correlation between independence and inflation rate was merely 
a statistical correlation and therefore not to be confused with causality.44 Several 
empirical studies in fact pointed to the conclusion that reaching the price stability 
goal depended less on the institutional status of the central bank but mainly on the 
inflation culture of a society.45 Thus, in countries where preventing inflation was 
regarded as a necessary requirement for the prosperity of a society even a dependent 
central bank would be able to safeguard price stability.46 However, no independent 
central bank would stand a chance against a “culture of inflation” – especially as 
the independent status was mostly guaranteed only by statute (and not by the 
constitution).47 Yet again, these findings alone still not deliver a decisive argument 
against independence as such: In the worst case this status would be merely 
ineffective and thus useless but still not harmful. Hayo and Hefeker, however, doubt 
such a “useless but not harmful” conclusion due to the fact that there is no proven 
negative correlation between independence and inflation. Under such 
                                                          
41 R. Vaubel, The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and 
international evidence, European Journal of Political Economy Vol. 13 (1997), 201 ff. –  a problem 
known and debated also regarding the independent judicial branch by the way. 
42 See also U. Reumann, Die Europäische Zentralbank, p. 26. 
43 See W. Heun, Die Zentralbank in den USA – das Federal Reserve System, Staatswissenschaften 
und Staatspraxis, 9 (1998), p. 263.  
44 B. Hayo/C. Hefeker, Reconsidering central bank independence, European Journal of Political 
Economy 18 (2002), p. 654: „In other words, this correlation does not indicate causality.“ 
45 B. Hayo/C. Hefeker, Reconsidering central bank independence, European Journal of Political 
Economy 18 (2002), p. 654, for the different inflation cultures p. 663 ff. According to them an 
independent central bank is mainly installed in countries where preventing inflation is deemed 
highly significant. See also J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 219 f. 
46 See also H. James, Making the European Monetary Union, p. 272. 
47 Specially regarding this aspect B. Hayo/C. Hefeker, Reconsidering central bank independence, 
European Journal of Political Economy 18 (2002), p. 659 f. Respective threats to remove the 
independent status occurred in Germany, for instance, in 1956 when Konrad Adenauer was unhappy 
with the monetary policy of the Bundesbank. However, to change the independent status of the ECB 
the European Treaties would have to be amended, including a ratification of such an amendment in 
all the Member States (Art. 48 TEU). 
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circumstances, Hayo and Hefeker point out, it appeared hardly justifiable to put 
monetary policy in the hands of an independent and conservative agent whose 
decisions were not foreseeable yet, once taken, impossible to amend for the 
politicians in charge48 – especially due to the existing lobbying structures49 that 
might influence the decisions taken by such an agent. Nevertheless Hayo and 
Hefeker do not oppose an independent central bank under all circumstances. 
According to their findings there might be rational reasons for a society to stick to 
such a model where it was compatible with the general political and legal system 
as well as the organisation of the labour market. What they wanted to make clear, 
however, was the fact that an independent status was neither generally the best 
status nor for itself sufficient for safeguarding price stability. It appears fair to say, 
therefore, that a lot of questions (still) remain open.   
As a legal scholar one will obviously not be able to solve this economic dispute. 
However, it makes clear that a society deciding in favour of an independent central 
bank is at least not completely off track as regards its economic rationality.50 Yet, 
from a legal perspective such a decision obviously needs to be compatible with all 
relevant normative, especially constitutional requirements. And here the democratic 
principle comes into play – an aspect not least the German literature has dealt with 
in abundance (first regarding the Bundesbank and now the ECB). 
 
II. (German) Democratic Theory 
Compliance with the democratic principle first of all does not follow automatically 
from the abovementioned (possible) economic rationality behind the independent 
status of a central bank.51 To modify a quote by the German legal scholar Christoph 
Möllers: “Good reasons (alone) do not create democratic legitimation.”52 If one 
                                                          
48 B. Hayo/C. Hefeker, Reconsidering central bank independence, European Journal of Political 
Economy 18 (2002), p. 659: „If it is not possible to observe a central banker’s characteristics, then 
society (or its government) should have the means to overrule or correct actions taken by the central 
bank. However, this is not possible with a truly independent central bank.“ 
49 B. Hayo/C. Hefeker, Reconsidering central bank independence, European Journal of Political 
Economy 18 (2002), p. 665 f. 
50 Cf. H.Siekmann in: H. Siekmann, EWU, 2013, Art. 130 AEUV mn. 34 and U. Häde, in: C. 
Calliess/M. Ruffert, EUV/AEUV, 4th ed. 2011, Art. 130 AEUV mn. 9: „[…] deutliche Hinweise auf 
einen Zusammenhang zwischen Unabhängigkeit und Preisstabilität.“ Whether the ECB should 
receive such an independent status, however, was highly disputed when constructing the EMU, see 
H. James, Making the European Monetary Union, p. 270 ff.; 278 ff. 
51 See also U. Häde, in: C. Calliess/M. Ruffert, EUV/AEUV, 4th ed. 2011, Art. 130 AEUV mn. 37 
ff. 
52 C. Möllers, Demokratie – Zumutungen und Versprechungen, 2008, mn. 54. 
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considers the dual democratic concept of Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde – a concept 
especially the German Constitutional Court has taken over53 – such a central bank 
lacks the necessary material legitimation or the “content-legitimation”.54 Due to the 
unavoidable discretion of any central bank as regards monetary policy – 
unavoidable even for a rules based “taylorized” central bank – this deficit of 
legitimacy can thereby be compensated only partly (if at all) by binding the central 
bank to a more detailed statutory framework.55 The central question for German 
legal scholars therefore is whether the unavoidable deficit of legitimacy can be 
justified or not. The literature to this question appears endless,56 yet the answer 
given is more or less undisputed today: Due to the at least defensible relation 
between an independent central bank and price stability the overwhelming majority 
of German scholars negates a violation of the democratic principle.57 We thus find 
a “justification by task”58 with the following argument: If there is indeed a relation 
between the two (independence and price stability) then it seems impossible to 
transfer the task of safeguarding price stability onto a central bank while at the same 
time denying it the mandatory status needed to perform successfully. Such a 
“justification by task” is thus only possible for the area of monetary policy, as it is 
only here that the independent status is mandatory to fulfil the transferred task59 – 
a consequence that might explain the problems a lot of German scholars have with 
the current policy of the ECB as this also makes it necessary to interpret the 
                                                          
53 See H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier, Grundgesetz Band II, 2010, 2006, Art. 20 mn. 113 ff. 
54 See for a detailed analysis K.-P. Sommermann, in: H. von Mangoldt/H. Klein/C. Starck, 
Grundgesetz Band 2, 6. Aufl. 2010, Art. 20 Abs. 2 mn. 168. 
55 Which, by the way, marks a significant difference to the judiciary. 
56 Instead of many see F. Brosius-Gersdorf, Deutsche Bundesbank und Demokratieprinzip, 1997, p. 
127 ff. 
57 See for instance B. Kempen, in: R. Streinz, EUV/AEUV, 2. Aufl. 2010, Art. 130 AEUV, mn. 5; 
J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 272 ff. See also the remarks of the German 
Constitutional Court in its Mastricht-Decision: BVerfGE 89, 155 (208): „Die Verselbständigung der 
meisten Aufgaben der Währungspolitik bei einer unabhängigen Zentralbank löst staatliche 
Hoheitsgewalt aus unmittelbarer staatlicher oder supranationaler parlamentarischer 
Verantwortlichkeit, um das Währungswesen dem Zugriff von Interessengruppen und der an einer 
Wiederwahl interessierten politischen Mandatsträger zu entziehen […]. Diese Einschränkung der 
von den Wählern in den Mitgliedstaaten ausgehenden demokratischen Legitimation berührt das 
Demokratieprinzip, ist jedoch als eine in Art. 88 Satz 2 GG vorgesehene Modifikation dieses 
Prinzips mit Art. 79 Abs. 3 GG vereinbar.“ See also H. Sodan, Die funktionelle Unabhängigkeit der 
Zentralbanken, NJW 1999, 1521 (1521 f.). 
58 M. Höreth, Die Europäische Union im Legitimationstrilemma, 1999, p. 230. 
59 H. Siekmann, in: H. Siekmann, EWU, 2013, Art. 130 AEUV mn. 69 f.; J. Endler, Europäische 
Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 272 f., 566 f.; E. Peuker, Die Anwendung nationaler 
Rechtsvorschriften durch Unionsorgane – ein Konstruktionsfehler der europäischen 
Bankenaufsicht, JZ 2014, 764 (768). 
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monetary mandate restrictively.60 Any other task transferred to an independent 
institution cannot be justified with this argument, making it necessary to either find 
a different one – which will be very difficult according to the German interpretation 
of the democratic principle – or to refrain from transferring the task in the first 
place. An independent central bank officially equipped with economic competences 
therefore always triggers alarm signals for German scholars. The fact that Art. 127 
(1) TFEU states that „the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the 
Union” appears acceptable only as long as this part of the mandate is interpreted in 
a narrow sense respecting its clear subordination under the ECB’s primary task of 
safeguarding price stability. This special “German sensibility” forms the main 
background of the whole dispute that arose between the German Constitutional 
Court and the ECB during the Eurocrisis (especially as regards the OMT-Program) 
and might also be the reason why the ECB never reverted to its “economic” part of 
its mandate, even though this probably would have been possible from a normative 
perspective.61 Unsurprisingly the German Constitutional Court also reverted to this 
argument in its second preliminary ruling initiated in July 2017.62 
It also seems noteworthy that the independent status of the central bank – from a 
German perspective – cannot be justified with the special expertise or competence 
of the relevant central bankers, automatically leading to “better” monetary 
decisions. Such a justification “by expertise” would not be acceptable to the 
German Basic Law as it would undermine (at least in the long run) the general 
requirement of dual legitimation.63 Why not revert to such a “rule of authorized 
experts”64 in all important political areas if experts are obviously more competent 
to find “right” or at least “better” answers than “normal” politicians? Such a concept 
– once again and just recently proposed by Jason Brennan65 – would finally lead to 
a self-abolishment of democracy and indeed: Brennan himself prefers a “moderate 
epistocracy”. However, such a concept not only neglects the basic idea of free 
equality of each individual but also (and more importantly) completely misses the 
                                                          
60 This was pointed out once again in BVerfG, 18.7.2017, 2 BvR 859/15 and others, mn. 102 f.  
61 Because there were no inflationary (or deflationary) tendencies in 2012 so that economic support 
measures would have been possible. 
62 See BVerfG, 18.7.2017, 2 BvR 859/15 and others, mn. 102 ff. 
63 See also J. H. Klement, Der Euro und seine Demokratie, ZG 2014, 169 (191), A. Thiele, 
Verlustdemokratie, p. 244 ff. and A. Thiele, Finanzaufsicht (Fn. 4), p. 429 ff.  
64 To hat term see  H. P. Bull, Die „völlig unabhängige“ Aufsichtsbehörde. Zum Urteil des EuGH 
vom 9.3.2010 in Sachen Datenschutzaufsicht, EuZW 2010, 488 (492). 
65 J. Brennan, Against Democracy, 2017. 
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fact that it is impossible to conclude which decision would actually have been 
“right” or “better”. Even experts (or epistocrats) can be mistaken and with more 
than one expert asked we will usually find more than one opinion how to proceed. 
Or to put it with Winston Churchill: “If you put two economists in a room, you 
get two opinions, unless one of them is Lord Keynes, in which case you get three 
opinions." So which one of these expert opinions is “right” or “better”? The 
problem can be witnessed in the current ECB-Debate: German experts are 
criticizing ECB-experts and each side obviously believes it is right and has the 
better arguments. But why should a society have to live with the opinion of the 
more or less randomly chosen expert leading the independent agency and not be 
free to choose which expert to follow? In other words: „auctoritas, non veritas facit 
legem.“66 These relations between independence and democracy should not be 
forgotten as the voices demanding more and more independent agencies are getting 
louder and louder – not only but especially at the European level.67   
 
C. Manifestations of Independence 
Independence does not necessarily equal independence as it can manifest itself in 
various forms.68 When speaking of independence it is thus vital to define what is 
actually meant; there is no such thing as “the” independence that either prevails or 
not. It is thus hardly surprising that central banks indeed differ significantly when 
it comes to the degree of their independence. In the following I want to give a short 
summary of the three probably most relevant manifestations of independence69 
before taking a closer look at possible limitations and threats.70 
First of all we can find „Goal-Independence“, giving the central bank the authority 
to define its monetary objective autonomously without interference by the 
government. However, this form of independence is not to be misinterpreted as 
giving the central bank complete freedom which monetary policy goal(s) to pursue. 
                                                          
66 See J. Schmidt, Die demokratische Legitimationsfunktion der parlamentarischen Kontrolle, 2007, 
p. 321. And another quote by C. Möllers, Demokratie – Zumutungen und Versprechungen, 2008, 
mn. 57: „Der Einwand von Experten, dass in Demokratien ohne Kompetenz entschieden würde, 
zeigt die demokratische Inkompetenz der Experten.“ 
67 H. P. Bull, Die „völlig unabhängige“ Aufsichtsbehörde. Zum Urteil des EuGH vom 9.3.2010 in 
Sachen Datenschutzaufsicht, EuZW 2010, p. 488 ff. 
68 H. Siekmann, in: H. Siekmann, EWU, 2013, Art. 130 AEUV mn. 41. 
69 C. E. Walsh, Central bank independence, Prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary, 2005, p. 3 f., 
who especially highlights the „goal independence and the „instrumental independence“ 
70 For further manifestations see H. Siekmann, in: H. Siekmann, EWU, 2013, Art. 130 AEUV, mn. 
42 ff. 
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The general monetary policy goals are in fact assigned to the central bank 
normatively by statute (with safeguarding price stability regularly standing in the 
centre). Goal-independence thus allows a central bank not to choose but to 
autonomously interpret these goals and especially formulate its understanding of 
price stability in a binding way. The answer to this question is economically less 
clear than one might think, yet obviously has tremendous consequences as regards 
the monetary steps required. Although practically all central banks therefore are 
assigned with safeguarding price stability the internal inflation target can differ 
significantly and also might change over time – the Bank of Japan, for instance, 
doubled its internal inflation target from 1% to 2% in January 2013 (with the general 
goal of price stability remaining unaltered). Next to the Fed the ECB also enjoys 
such goal-independence; from a normative perspective the ECB therefore not only 
has the possibility but the duty to autonomously set its internal inflation target71 and 
according to Art. 130 TFEU is thereby not allowed to “seek or take instructions” 
(neither from the Union nor from the Member States). The term “price stability” in 
Art. 127 (1) TFEU is a so-called “undefined legal term” that has to be “filled with 
life” primarily by the ECB itself – a conclusion that (as we will see later) necessarily 
has consequences as regards the intensity of judicial control in this core area of 
monetary policy. Currently the ECB has set its inflation target at “under, but close 
to 2%”.72 Compatible with its mandate, however, would not only be a slightly lower 
but also a slightly higher inflation target of up to 3% or even 4% percent.73 The 
Bank of England – not only the oldest but clearly one of the most important central 
banks worldwide – enjoys no such goal-independence, as the concrete inflation 
target is decided upon by the government on a yearly basis;74 its degree of 
independence thus differs significantly when compared to the one of the ECB.   
Goal-choice-independence as the second form of independence allows a central 
bank to choose autonomously from a certain catalogue of assigned goals and to 
decide which of these goals to pursue with priority depending on the economic 
environment; it thus reaches further than mere goal-independence. We find this 
                                                          
71 C. E. Walsh, Central bank independence, Prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary, 2005, p. 3 f. 
72 See ECB, Die Geldpolitik der EZB, 2011, p. 71. For the economic background see A. Thiele, Das 
Mandat der EZB und die Krise des Euro, p. 27 ff. Now also see BVerfG, 18.7.2017, 2 BvR 859/15 
and others, mn. 117: “Das Ziel des PSPP, die Inflationsrate auf knapp 2% steigern zu wollen, stellt 
nach Auffassung des Senats eine grundsätzlich zulässige Konkretisierung der Aufgabe dar, die 
Preisstabilität zu sichern.“ 
73 See also A. Thiele, Das Mandat der EZB und die Krise des Euro, p. 31. 
74 C. E. Walsh, Central bank independence, Prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary, 2005, p. 3. 
13 
 
form of functional independence in the United States, for example, where Section 
2A of the Federal Reserve Act defines the general monetary goals and states that 
the Fed “shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates 
commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as 
to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates.” Section 2A, however, says nothing as regards a 
possible hierarchy of these individual goals, a question which is thus left to the Fed 
to decide. In contrast, the ECB has to pursue its core purpose – price stability – with 
priority and is only allowed to support the economic policy in the Union as long as 
this core purpose is not inflicted. From a German perspective such a normative 
priority (see Art. 127 TFEU) appears mandatory due to the above mentioned 
assumptions regarding the democratic principle – any form of functional 
independence similar to the one of the Fed would simply not be acceptable. 
Finally the instrumental independence enables a central bank to autonomously 
decide on the instruments it deems most fitting to reach the general monetary policy 
goals. However, usually a central bank will again not be completely free, but bound 
to a certain instrumental mix laid down in the relevant statute. But this instrumental 
mix will generally be very broad and usually not exclusive, thus allowing the central 
bank to react to the countless possible economic surroundings that might occur.75 
Restrictions on the other hand will usually be introduced by a catalogue of generally 
forbidden instruments. Art. 127 (1) TFEU for instance states that the ECB shall act 
in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition,76 binding the ECB to a wide range of market-compliant instruments, 
while explicitly prohibiting the direct (not the indirect) purchase of state bonds in 
Art. 123 TFEU.77 The statute then lists a few typical monetary instruments and in 
Art. 20 even introduces an “instrument-invention-right” according to which the 
ECB-Council “may, by a majority of two thirds of the votes cast, decide upon the 
use of such other operational methods of monetary control as it sees fit, respecting 
Article 2.”78 This instrumental-independence thereby also includes the right of a 
central bank to decide autonomously on the methods it uses to measure the current 
                                                          
75 See also A. Thiele, Das Mandat der EZB und die Krise des Euro, p. 41 ff. 
76 See for details U. Reumann, Die Europäische Zentralbank, p. 91 ff. 
77 In detail see A. Thiele, Das Mandat der EZB und die Krise des Euro, p. 63 ff. 
78 See J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 477 ff. and U. Reumann, Die 
Europäische Zentralbank, p. 96 ff. 
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inflation rate and the general economic situation of the respective monetary area. 
Again we find no broadly accepted economic method all central banks would have 
to revert to in this field – and the existing models indeed vary significantly in the 
results they produce. Just think of the implementation of asset-prices: It is highly 
disputed whether their development should be (and if so: how they should be) 
considered when evaluating the inflation rate – a question obviously of great 
relevance for the final result of the measurement. The ECB has up to now refused 
to consider the asset-prices directly, uses the respective data, however, when 
implementing her two-pillar-strategy – from a normative perspective a decision 
clearly covered by its wide instrumental independence.79  
 
D. Limitations and threats 
What are the limitations of these forms of independence and what measures might 
pose a threat to the independent status of the ECB? 
 
I. Limitations 
Limitations here refer to boundaries of independence and thus to measures that 
might challenge the independent status yet (clearly) without violating it (despite 
some parts of the public believing otherwise). These measures are thus permissible 
from a normative perspective what doesn’t mean they might not infringe other 
social behavioural customs or the idea of “approved political etiquette” (though 
with the new American president and his staff these standards have clearly reached 
a new low). As it is obviously not possible to discuss all measures that are 
compatible with the independent status of a central bank, I would like to focus on 
the following three: Public criticism of the central bank by the media and political 
or economic actors (1), certain duties to report to other European institutions (2) 
and finally duties to cooperate that might arise from the instance that the ECB 
became a formal institution with the Treaty of Lisbon (3). 
 
1. Public criticism 
The fact that monetary policy will hardly ever remain undisputed in public was 
recently and once again proven during the financial- and the following eurocrisis. 
                                                          
79 See A. Thiele, Das Mandat der EZB und die Krise des Euro, p. 32 f. 
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In most cases such criticism will thereby focus on the concrete measures taken by 
the ECB, thus touching its instrumental independence. The ECB’s definition of 
price stability – as part of its goal-independence – has indeed hardly ever been part 
of such a public debate and in actual fact seems broadly accepted80 (with just a few 
German scholars making an exception). This might change, however, if the ECB 
should ever think of raising its inflation target above the current 2% mark, though 
this is clearly not on the ECB’s current agenda. The question interesting here, 
however, is: When does such open critique of the ECB (no matter which form of 
independence might be concerned) appear problematic as regards its independence. 
To answer this question it is necessary to differentiate: 
First of all critique, possibly even very harsh critique, expressed by the interested 
public (either by academic scholars or the relevant media) will generally not 
infringe the ECB’s instrumental independence. Monetary policy of an independent 
central bank does not take place in a discourse-free area and it can and has to be 
expected that any central bank (respectively its governors) are able to withstand 
such open critique. At least in a democratic system no institution can expect to act 
without ever being criticised. In fact, especially in a highly disputed area such as 
monetary policy, open criticism can positively influence the performance of a 
central bank as it is constantly forced to reflect its own decisions and diligently 
examine the proposed alternatives – even where the critique should not be mirrored 
in an adjustment of its monetary actions. Such external input can thus rationalize 
the internal decision making process and finally lead to a “better” central bank. Any 
central bank is therefore well advised not to completely neglect such critique but to 
implement it at least into the public presentation of its measures taken by making 
clear why these might have fallen out differently. And it would by no means be 
condemnable if a central bank should react to such critique by modifying or even 
completely changing its decisions. Commentaries such as “the central bank 
capitulated” are thus simply mistaken. It would obviously not be very functional if 
a central bank should stick to decisions only in order to prevent the impression that 
it might have reacted to external critique. Independence does not manifest itself in 
a general resistance to criticism, even though it would be just as senseless if a central 
bank should generally arrange its actions according to the public opinion. Its own 
                                                          
80 This question, however, was highly disputed when constructing the EMU. 
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conclusion as regards the “correct” economic decision therefore always has to 
remain the only benchmark for its monetary policy, no matter who formulated it in 
the first place – something that indeed requires a certain amount of internal 
independence and sovereignty of the central bankers, especially in times of crisis.  
Criticism by politicians on the other hand might have to be interpreted differently.81 
Though such criticism clearly is no formal instruction in the sense of Art. 130 
TFEU, depending on how it is formulated it might come very close. Although again 
independent central bankers should generally not let themselves be influenced by 
such critique,82 this internal independence might be on for a tough test, depending 
especially who expressed such critique. To avoid any impression of being 
influenced, at least certain central bankers might act “too independent” and decide 
to generally omit such political critique in order to prove their independence – even 
in cases where they might actually find the presented arguments convincing and 
would thus consider an amendment of their policy. This danger especially exits 
where the independent status of a central bank is not easily amended by the 
respective government,83 as is indeed the case for the ECB.84 Well-intentioned 
critique formulated by politicians thus might lead to worse central bank decisions – 
a result no one could have an interest in (not even politicians).  
These possible negative effects, however, should not lead to the conclusion that 
politicians would have to refrain from any comments regarding the monetary policy 
of the ECB from a normative perspective. Again one needs to consider that 
independence does not uncouple the central bank from all political discourse – as 
Milton Friedman pointed out, „Money is too important to be left to the central 
bankers.“85 Or, in other words: Elected politicians have to be able to talk about 
monetary policy. Well-intentioned advice, presented in a factual manner is thus 
perfectly acceptable,86 one can and must expect a certain amount of coolness on the 
                                                          
81 See also J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 413. 
82 See also U. Häde, in: Calliess/Ruffert, EUV/AEUV, 5th .Ed. 2016, Art. 130 AEUV mn. 15. 
83 Because the central bank then does not have to fear such an amendment and can thus present its 
independence more or less risk free. See also J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, 
p. 248. 
84 As the independence of the ECB is laid down in the treaties any modification would require a 
treaty amendment according to Art. 48 TEU including a ratification in all Member States. On the 
other hand the independence of the German Bundesbank was only guaranteed by a simple statute 
(and not the constitution) 
85 M. Friedman, Should There Be an Independent Bank?, in: Yeager, In Search of a Monetary 
Constitution, 1962, 219 (219): Friedman, however, spoke out against the independent status 
generally. 
86 J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 413. 
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side of the central bankers in this respect.  Practical experience confirms this result, 
being appointed as a central banker generally seems to lead to an appropriate 
amount of independence-awareness on the side of the appointed87 – a phenomenon 
also known as the Beckett-Effect.88 Political statements, however, become 
problematic where they are formulated in a demanding manner and are more or less 
openly connected with certain expectations how the central bank should react in the 
near future. Yet, in most cases and as long as these statements are not linked to the 
threat of consequences or sanctions89 such a behavior will be less a normative than 
a question of decent political style.90 There is thus no clear cut between acceptable 
political statements on the one hand and inacceptable influencing on the other,91 
and it would be indeed utopian to link the independent status with the end of any 
form of political pressure.92 In fact the independent status is the necessary (though 
not sufficient) requirement, for the central bankers to face up to such political 
pressure. One should thereby also consider that it might be a lot more threatening 
for the democratic process if politicians should generally refrain from any critical 
statement due to a false understanding of independence than if they should now and 
then go a little too far with their critique – especially as neither the public nor the 
media would appreciate such “over-the-line-criticism”. So this also speaks for a 
reserved approach towards the normative limitations for political critique. As a 
general rule, therefore, critical statements formulated by politicians might challenge 
the internal independence of the central bankers but will not violate the instrumental 
independence of the ECB itself.   
 
2. Duties to report to European institutions  
                                                          
87 True also for other independent positions, see for instance the actions taken by Christine Lagarde, 
the Executive Director of the IMF and former French finance minister. 
88 Thomas Beckett was Lord Chancellor and Adviser to King Henry II and became Arch Bishop of 
Canterbury in 1162. In this new position he vividly fought for the interests of the church (and not 
those of the King) so that he was finally murdered by the King’s cronies. See also J. Endler, 
Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 249 f.  
89 Such threats might raise inflation expectations of the market participants no matter whether they 
were successful or not, see J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 413 f. 
90 Different opinion H. Siekmann, in: Siekmann , EWU, 2013, Art. 130 AEUV mn. 19 and M. Potacs, 
in: J. Schwarze, EU-Kommentar, Art. 130 AEUV mn. 1, who explicitly states that pressure form the 
media is a violation of the treaties. 
91 See also U. Häde, in: Calliess/Ruffert, EUV/AEUV, 5th ed. 2016, Art. 130 AEUV mn. 15. 
92 Not convincing therefore the statement of the ECJ, No. C-11/00, mn. 134 (Commission/ECB) 
according to which the independent status “seeks, in essence, to shield the ECB from all political 
pressure in order to enable it effectively to pursue the objectives attributed to its tasks, through the 
independent exercise of the specific powers conferred on it for that purpose by the EC Treaty and 
the ESCB Statute.” 
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Not only compatible with its independent status but necessary in any democratic 
system are certain duties to report to other institutions (and the public) that are thus 
foreseen in practically all central bank systems. For the ECB we find such rules in 
Art. 15 of its statute and Art. 284 (3) TFEU.93 Additionally, the ECB is monitored 
by the Court of Auditors and is integrated into the European Anti Fraud System 
(OLAF).94 Only such duties to report secure the minimum standard of 
accountability necessary for any authority in a democracy.95 By reporting and 
explaining the central bank thus takes the necessary responsibility for its actions 
and thereby also ensures that no other institution (for instance the government) is 
held responsible in public. Above that reporting and openly discussing its policies 
has at least partly the same effect as public criticism: The ECB is forced to reflect 
its actions and thereby might find better solutions how to react in future. In the long 
run a central bank will indeed only succeed if it is able to explain in a 
comprehensible manner why it acted in a certain way (and not in another), making 
arbitrary action more or less impossible.96 Independent activity is no secret 
occupation, the ECB is no “Black-Box”.  Its actions need to be critically 
accompanied not only by the public but also by the European Parliament97 and even 
the national parliaments98. And within this process critical statements are not only 
possible but welcomed as long as they are brought forward in an adequate manner. 
Central bankers do not have to be handled as if they were “raw eggs”. 
 
3. Duties to cooperate 
With the treaty of Lisbon the ECB was assigned formal institutional status by being 
included in the list of institutions in Art. 13 TEU.99 Formally this changed nothing 
as regards its independent status. Yet, the ECB articulated concerns that the “mutual 
                                                          
93 See also U. Reumann, Die Europäische Zentralbank, p. 184ff. For the American central bank see 
W. Heun, Die Zentralbank in den USA – das Federal Reserve System, Staatswissenschaften und 
Staatspraxis, 9 (1998), p. 260. 
94 As regards the compatibility of the integration of the ECB into OLAF with its independent status 
see ECJ, No. C-11/00, mn. 135 (Commission/ECB). See also H. Siekmann, in: Siekmann, EWU, 
2013, Art. 130 AEUV mn. 136 ff. 
95 C. E. Walsh, Central bank independence, Prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary, 2005, p. 9. 
96 This is also the reason why the publication of the minutes of the ECB-Council meetings is to be 
welcomed. 
97 See U. Reumann, Die Europäische Zentralbank, p. 184 ff. 
98 There are no official duties for the ECB to report to the national parliaments. However, it is to be 
welcomed if the ECB-President discusses his monetary policy with the national parliaments, 
especially in countries where the public seems very critical towards certain actions. 
99 For the institutional settings according to the Lisbon Treaty see A. Thiele, Europarecht, 14th ed. 
2017, p. 64 ff. 
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sincere cooperation” with the other institutions it is now obliged to according to 
Art. 13 (2) TEU might interfere with its independent status.100 These concerns, 
however, were unfounded. First of all such an obligation to cooperate with the other 
institutions might not have been laid down explicitly in the treaty of Nice, it 
nonetheless existed. The ECB never acted completely autonomously outside the 
EU’s formal institutional system, was in fact smoothly embedded in this complex 
structure, a point made quite clear by the ECJ in its OLAF-Judgement.101 And 
second of all, the degree of this imperative to cooperate is limited by the concrete 
institutional mandate of the respective institution as created by the treaties. A duty 
to cooperate therefore only comes into consideration as far as the mandate of the 
ECB is not threatened or infringed. It is only within this frame that the ECB is 
obliged to consider the interests of the other institutions and commence a 
cooperative dialogue;102 an obligation, however, that never turns into an 
unconditional duty to coordinate in advance – a conclusion confirmed when looking 
at the other independent institutions (ECJ and Court of Auditors).103 And such a 
dialogue between the relevant institutions in any case appears more than sensible, 
especially when it comes to the overlapping areas of monetary and fiscal- and 
economic-policy and can clearly not be seen as a threat to its independence.104  
 
II. Threats to independent monetary policy 
As possible threats to monetary policy I would like to discuss certain scenarios in 
which the central bank might still be acting independently from a formal 
perspective, while its actual scope of action, however, appears dramatically 
diminished due to specific external influences. In such cases the central bank then 
might be forced to take actions it might not have taken otherwise, a scenario 
discussed here regarding the fiscal and wage-policy of the Member States on the 
one hand (1) and the ECB’s intended and partly already carried out bond purchase 
programs on the other (2). And finally a certain external monetary philosophy might 
be imposed on the “independent” central bank where a too extensive judicial control 
                                                          
100 See U. Häde, in: Calliess/ Ruffert, EUV/AEUV, 5th ed. 2016, Art. 282 AEUV mn. 49. 
101 ECJ, No. C-11/00, mn. 92, 135 f. (Commission/ECB). 
102 See C. Calliess, in: Calliess/ Ruffert, EUV/AEUV, 5th ed. 2016, Art. 13 EUV mn. 28. 
103 In this sense also H. Siekmann, in: H. Siekmann, EWU, 2013, Art. 130 AEUV mn. 160. 
104 More to this relationship below. 
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makes certain monetary actions impossible the central bank deems necessary to 
safeguard price stability (3). 
  
1. Fiscal and wage policy of the Member States 
The fact that the fiscal and the wage policy of the Member States have a significant 
influence on monetary policy is first of all neither surprising nor specifically 
problematic. All these policies might pursue different objectives yet do not stand 
completely separately next to each other.105 If a central bank thus reacts to fiscal or 
wage policy decisions by amending its monetary policy this is nothing 
objectionable – just as monetary policy decisions might have consequences for the 
fiscal policy of a Member State when the central bank adjusts the key interest rate 
for instance. Regularly consultations between central bank and Member States thus 
appear more than sensible in order to avoid unexpected decisions for the respective 
other side. As regards the independence it is crucial alone that the ECB finally 
decides on its monetary policy autonomously solely on the foundation of its 
monetary mandate. And within this decision making process it is not objectionable 
if the central bank should finally vote for an option of action that interferes least 
with (or even supports) financial policy. Well founded and independent monetary 
policy is not necessarily linked to hurting fiscal or other policies of the Member 
States. Actions of the central bank should only then have negative consequences 
where this seems unavoidable from a monetary policy perspective – then, however, 
the central bank has no other choice than to interfere and take such “hurtful” actions.  
Independence is threatened, however, if fiscal and wage policy should provoke 
economic consequences that make it more or less impossible for the central bank to 
fulfil its mandate. As regards the financial policy this is the case especially in times 
of excessive public debt. Due to the reduced political scope of action in such times, 
states have a huge interest to at least partly reduce their debt burden by monetarizing 
their debt with the help of an unanticipated inflationary monetary policy and 
additional seigniorage earnings.106 In “normal” times one should obviously expect 
an independent central bank to resist such political pressure. In fact this kind of 
pressure was the actual reason to introduce independent central banks in the first 
place. It gets problematic, however, as soon as the public debt ratio reaches a level 
                                                          
105 See also E. Görgens/K. Ruckriegel/F. Seitz, Europäische Geldpolitik, 5th ed. 2008, p. 370 ff. 
106J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 252. 
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that raises doubt on the medium- and long-term sustainability of public debt. If in 
such an environment the real interest rate should be above the economic growth 
rate (r bigger g) – and this is no particular unrealistic scenario – this debt ratio will 
rise further even in the case of a balanced primary budget (so called “dept trap”).107 
If one excludes a national bankruptcy that obviously can only be the absolute last 
resort from a political perspective there are only two ways to reduce the debt ratio 
under such circumstances: Either the state manages to produce significant primary 
surpluses, an option that will not only be very stressful but hardly possible overnight 
or monetary policy becomes more expansive. The amount of continuously rising 
pressure on a central bank to do the latter is easily imaginable and might for itself 
create inflationary tendencies no matter whether the central bank finally gives in or 
not. If instruments such as the fiscal compact108 and others try to keep public debt 
at a sustainable level then this is therefore clearly to be welcomed by any 
independent central bank.109 However, to avoid dramatic economic downfalls one 
will have to ensure that respective measures are not taken by all Member States at 
the same time – an aspect in my view currently not sufficiently respected110 – 
especially as the debt ratios are by no means critical in all the Member States of the 
Eurozone. None the least in Germany the public debate completely negates the 
positive consequences of a modest public indebtedness.  
The consequences of a failed national wage policy within a monetary union also 
became visible during the Eurocrisis. To prevent a reduction of competitiveness it 
is essential that wage rises within a monetary union do not exceed the rise in 
productivity as the alternative remedy of a currency depreciation is impossible. If 
this requirement is not respected huge trade deficits as well as rising unemployment 
rates might follow being an additional burden on the national finances that will yet 
again almost certainly augment the pressure on the central bank. However, also due 
                                                          
107 See E. Görgens/K. Ruckriegel/F. Seitz, Europäische Geldpolitik, 5th ed. 2008, p. 384 ff. 
108 For details on the fiscal compact see C. Calliess/C. Schoenfleisch, Auf dem Weg in die 
europäische “Fiskalunion”?, JZ 2012, 477 ff.; F. Schorkopf, Europas politische Verfasstheit im 
Lichte des Fiskalvertrages, Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 10 (2012), p. 1 ff.  as 
well as A. Thiele, The ‘German Way’ of Curbing Public Debt: The Constitutional Debt Brake and 
the Fiscal Compact – Why Germany has to Work on its Language Skills, European Constitutional 
Law Review 11 (2015), p. 30 ff.. For further instruments trying to ensure budgetary discipline see 
C. Calliess, Finanzkrisen als Herausforderung der internationalen, europäischen und nationalen 
Rechtsetzung, VVDStRL 71 (2012), 113 (166 ff.). 
109 See also J. Endler, Europäische Zentralbank und Preisstabilität, p. 254 f., 259 ff. 
110 See A. Thiele, The ‘German Way’ of Curbing Public Debt: The Constitutional Debt Brake and 
the Fiscal Compact – Why Germany has to Work on its Language Skills, European Constitutional 
Law Review 11 (2015), p. 30 ff.  
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to different wage calculation regimes111 the Member States, especially Greece, did 
not stick to this necessity. The reforms initiated in the respective Member States in 
the last years therefore point in the right direction – even Greece was just recently 
able to refinance itself on the financial markets for the first time in years. Yet, all 
these measures should not lead to an “austerity policy at all costs” – granting 
sufficient time for these reforms thus is vital for their success in the long run.112  
 
2. Bond purchases 
During the Eurocrisis the ECB purchased a significant amount of bonds of so called 
„crisis states“ according to its „Securities Market Program“ (SMP). The SMP was 
finally replaced by the „Outright Monetary Transactions“ (OMT) program, that, 
however, has so far not lead to a single bond purchase. In addition to this and in 
order to raise the inflation rate the ECB is currently buying bonds in a volume of 
around 60 billion Euro per month of all Member States of the Eurozone according 
to its quantitative easing program PSPP. All these measures were thereby covered 
by its monetary mandate113 – the doubts concerning the OMT program raised by 
the German Constitutional Court in 2014114 were convincingly rejected by the ECJ 
in 2016.115 And one can assume that the ECJ will give the same answer as regards 
the PSPP when it decides on the preliminary ruling initiated by the German 
Constitutional Court in July 2017.116 However, during the hearings concerning the 
OMT-program the German Bundesbank brought forward that such bond purchases 
might also raise questions as regards their compatibility with the independent status 
of the ECB. Though possibly justified to ensure the monetary transitional process, 
the Bundesbank pointed to the fact that they would nonetheless open the ECB to 
blackmail due to its own growing interest to prevent any form of state bankruptcy 
with a significant amount of bonds failing (leading to respective losses on the side 
                                                          
111 See M. Höpner/M. Lutter, One Currency and Many Modes of Wage Formation, MPIfG 
Discussion Paper 14/14 regarding the different wage calculation regimes in the Member States. 
112 For a detailed critique as regards the austerity policy of the Member States see M. Blyth, Austerity. 
The History of a Dangerous Idea, 2013. This, by the way, now also seems to be the official position 
of the IMF, see S. Lütz, Vom Washington Consensus zum Flexiblen Keynesianismus – der 
internationale Währungsfonds nach der Finanzkrise, PVS 55 (2014), 427 (436 f.). 
113 The PSPP is currently being reviewed by the German Constitutional Court, see A. Thiele, Die 
EZB vor Gericht, ZBB 2015, 295 (304 f.). 
114 W. Heun, Eine verfassungswidrige Verfassungsgerichtsentscheidung, JZ 2014, p. 331 ff.; A. 
Thiele, Friendly or unfriendly act?, German Law Journal 15 (2014), p. 241 ff. In detail A. Thiele, 
Das Mandat der EZB und die Krise des Euro, p. 57 ff. 
115 ECJ, No. 62/14 (Gauweiler). 
116 See BVerfG, 18.7.2017, 2 BvR 859/15 and others. 
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of the ECB).117 Is it thus possible for the ECB to infringe its own independent status 
when reverting to certain monetary measures by creating a situation where 
(sometime in the future) it might refrain from necessary monetary actions and risk 
missing its own inflation target in order to prevent possible and in the end self-
inflicted losses? 
To answer this question it is first of all important to recall that loss risks occur any 
time a central bank purchases any security paper outright. They are thus no special 
feature of state bonds. However, potential losses will usually be a lot higher in these 
cases than with other security papers and it is only with state bonds that central 
banks have a significant indirect influence on their default risk when setting the 
relevant interest rates. The dilemma a central bank finds itself in is therefore hardly 
to be denied. To separate from this possible dilemma, however, is the question 
whether it can be used to formulate clear normative limitations for state bond 
purchases by a central bank. If one does not want to generally forbid such purchases 
– a step hardly convincing due to the fact such purchases form a classical monetary 
instrument of practically all important central banks worldwide – one will have to 
set certain quantitative restrictions. But where? The relatively small amount of 
equity of the ECB (currently about 11 billion Euro) is obviously too low. So how 
much instead? Ten times the amount? Twenty times? And how to value each bond 
purchase respecting the clearly differing insolvency risks of the Member States 
within the Eurozone?118 These problems show that any quantitative limitation 
would have to be arbitrary and speak out for a formalistic interpretation. From a 
normative perspective it is thus only relevant whether the ECB reached its purchase 
decisions uninfluenced by other European or national institutions. The central bank 
itself is responsible for assessing possible risks when purchasing bonds and thereby 
also has to consider possible political pressure that might occur in times of crisis. 
In the end it all depends on the central bankers themselves: „As long as there is no 
absolute (and absolute convincing) strict rule, the people and personalities in charge 
will matter.“119 
 
                                                          
117 See also O. Issing, A New Paradigm for Monetary Policy?, CFS Working Paper No. 2013/02, p. 
5: „And huge stocks of government bond expose the central bank to economic risks and political 
pressure.“ 
118 In detail A. Thiele, Das Mandat der EZB und die Krise des Euro, p. 78 ff.  
119 O. Issing, A New Paradigm for Monetary Policy?, CFS Working Paper No. 2013/02, p. 14. 
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3. Judicial control 
Let me finally take a look at the relationship between independence and judicial 
control. While this had been more of an academic question in the past – hardly any 
central bank’s monetary actions worldwide were ever taken to court120 – the 
problem became practical in the aftermath of the eurocrisis with the German 
Constitutional Court putting the ECB’s OMT-program to a normative test by 
initiating a preliminary procedure before the ECJ in 2014.121 In July 2017 it then 
initiated a second preliminary ruling regarding the ECB’s general bond purchase 
program (PSPP). From a rule of law-perspective such a judicial control not only 
seems possible but virtually mandatory. It would hardly be acceptable if an 
institution dealing with administrative affairs were exempted from any other than 
public control simply because of its independent status122 as “independence 
dispenses the ECB neither from the Union nor from its law”.123 Additionally such 
judicial control is able to at least partly diminish the justified yet still unsatisfying 
legitimatory deficit of the ECB.124 And finally even from the perspective of the 
central bank itself such a judicial control appears acceptable as it is not intended to 
direct its monetary policy in detail but simply seeks to monitor the compliance with 
the general normative requirements of the ECB’s mandate. However, this last point 
already marks the potential area of conflict: If a central bank wants to pursue its 
monetary goals effectively it needs sufficient room for manoeuvre – especially in a 
complex and inhomogeneous monetary area as the EMU. Economically it will 
usually be impossible to determine a single monetary measure that clearly strikes 
out all the possible others. The independent status itself in actual fact only makes 
sense if it enables the central bank also to choose autonomously when to act and 
how to act. Where such a choice is taken either by the normative frame itself or the 
interpreting court hardly any room for autonomous decisions of the ECB remains. 
As regards the independence of a central bank it is thus not judicial control 
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121 BVerfG, Beschluss vom 14.1.2014, 2BvR 2728/13. 
122 U. Reumann, Die Europäische Zentralbank, p. 216. 
123 U. Häde, in: Calliess/ Ruffert, EUV/AEUV, 5th ed. 2016, Art. 130 AEUV mn. 10. See also ECJ, 
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generally125 but rather the intensity of such control that might appear 
problematic.126 Judicial control therefore has to step back where the court is 
functionally overstrained due to the economic complexity of the respective manner. 
The central bank needs to be equipped with a sufficient margin of appreciation that 
is extracted from judicial control.127 The detailed content of undefined legal terms 
(such as “price stability”) is thus to be determined not by the respective court but 
by the ECB itself. And the same is true for the evaluation of the current and future 
economic surroundings of the whole monetary area and the decision on the thus 
necessary monetary actions. Within its judicial control the court is thereby limited 
to verifying the general tenability of the central bank’s conclusions. It would not be 
compatible with the independent status if a court were to replace such tenable 
conclusions with its own – even if these should be regarded as equally tenable.128 
In its first request for preliminary ruling, however, the German Constitutional Court 
did exactly that by simply resuming the opposing position of the German 
Bundesbank, without losing a single word regarding the tenability of the opinion of 
the ECB. Why though should the opinion of the Bundesbank be of any higher 
normative value than the one of the ECB, especially if one considers the fact that 
the Bundesbank is actually a dependent part of the ESCB with the ECB at the 
top?129 And in its second request for preliminary ruling initiated in July 2017 the 
Constitutional Court explicitly pointed out that “the acceptance of the goals as 
defined by the relevant European institutions combined with the appreciation of a 
wide margin of discretion of these institutions and a limitation of judicial control is 
eligible to enable these institutions an independent disposition as regards the range 
of the competences transferred upon them. Such an understanding of the 
competences does not sufficiently respect the principle of conferral and the 
necessity to interpret the ECB’s mandate in a restrictive manner”.130 The 
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Constitutional Court then goes on to point out why it believes that the ECB’s bond 
purchase program therefore neither respects Art. 123 TFEU nor Art. 127 TFEU and 
thereby once again takes hardly any opposing statements by legal scholars131 into 
account that might prove at least the tenability of the ECB’s actions. The 
independence of the ECB therefore once again might be on for a tough test.  
 
E. Conclusion and outlook 
The independent status of a central bank remains economically disputed yet can be 
justified from a democratic perspective and continues to be the “normative reality” 
for the ECB. This status is neither threatened by harsh critique nor by duties to 
report or to cooperate that, in fact, actually might have a positive effect on its 
performance. However, a mistaken finance and wage policy of the Member States 
might have problematic consequences so that it seems more than sensible to try to 
ensure a sustainable level of debt with instruments such as the fiscal compact. On 
the other hand the positive effects of public indebtedness should not be neglected 
in this context – not least the situation in Germany never gave rise for the somewhat 
hysterical statements of some (conservative) politicians. The biggest threat for 
independence in actual fact might arise from a too intense judicial control granting 
the central bank not the necessary margin of appreciation it takes to successfully 
pursue its monetary goals. As regards the first preliminary ruling of the German 
Constitutional Court the ECJ in the end found the right answer and rejected the 
deficient approach of the German judges. However, finding the right balance 
between necessary control and autonomy of a central bank will continue to remain 
an important task not only for legal scholars132 – especially as the German 
Constitutional Court is apparently still struggling to accept any limitations at all.  
 
                                                          
131 The only exception being J. Langer, in: H. Siekmann, EWU, Art. 32 ESZB-Satzung, mn. 41 in 
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